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[A]rchitecture is art and science. . . . The end product contains both the 
rational and romantic . . . .1
 The issue of architectural plagiarism involves competing interests: promoting 
innovative progress in architectural design on the one hand, while protecting an 
architect’s unique creative work on the other.2 These competing interests are not 
mutually exclusive, despite the position taken by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida in Sieger Suarez Architectural Partnership, Inc. v. 
Arquitectonica International Corp.3 The Sieger Suarez case demonstrates the challenges 
in defining what type of architecture is protected under the Copyright Act as well as 
creating a working standard to evaluate copyright infringement claims.
 When Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1990 to include architectural 
works, its intention was to remedy this confusion and extend copyright protections to 
architectural structures.4 Prior to 1990, the Copyright Act explicitly included 
“diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans” but did 
not include “works of architecture.”5 In the legislative materials to the amendment, 
Congress recognized architecture as “a form of artistic expression that performs a 
significant societal purpose, domestically and internationally.”6 Architecture has 
traditionally been considered a high art in league with painting and sculpture; 
categorizing architecture for copyright protection purposes, however, is difficult 
because of the utilitarian function, or the useful everyday nature of buildings.7
 The critical issue in Sieger Suarez was the substantial similarity test for copyright 
infringement. To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff is required 
to show that she owns a valid copyright8 and that the architectural works in question 
are substantially similar.9 Substantial similarity is an ambiguous term that the 
Eleventh Circuit has defined as being present “where an average lay observer would 
1. Raleigh W. Newsam, II, Architecture and Copyright—Separating the Poetic from the Prosaic, 71 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1073, 1076 (1997).
2. See id. at 1079–80.
3. 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
4. See Newsam, supra note 1, at 1076–82.
5. H.R. Rep. No. 101-735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6942.
6. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6936. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 
1990 recognized architecture as a new category of copyright subject matter in the United States. 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012); see also Newsam, supra note 1, at 1076. 
7. See Newsam, supra note 1, at 1077; see also David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection 
Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection Made a Difference?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 3 (2010) (describing 
architect’s artistry as f lourishing “even though their works received only second-class protection under 
Unites States copyright law until 1990”).
8. The plaintiff is also required to show that the defendant had access to the architectural plans protected 
by a copyright, which is not disputed in this case. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
9. Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2008).
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recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”10 
Additionally, the court has described substantial similarity as a question of “whether 
a reasonable jury could find the competing designs substantially similar at the level 
of protected expression.”11
 The Copyright Act defines protectable “architectural work” as “the design of a 
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, 
architectural plans, or drawings.”12 An architectural work “includes the overall form as 
well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but 
does not include individual standard features.”13 The overall compilation or arrangement 
consists of the individual design elements and standard features that are not protected—
such as a window unit, the dimensions of a room, or the use of a balcony.14 Under the 
substantial similarity analysis, only the architectural work’s arrangement as a whole, 
called an “expression,” is protected, whereas the individual design elements, called 
“ideas,” are not protected.15 Thus, the important focus in a substantial similarity 
analysis is on the architectural design’s overall compilation or arrangement.16
 The inclusion of architectural structures under the Copyright Act was a step 
forward. However, critics have identified a problem with the distinction between 
expressions and ideas, claiming courts apply too thin a layer of protection to 
“architectural work” despite the Copyright Act’s expansive definition of the term.17 
Courts have established that only “expressions” in architectural works are protectable, 
not “ideas.”18 However, the distinction between an expression and an idea is unclear 
and has been determined on a case-by-case basis.19
10. Id. at 1224 (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th 
Cir. 1982)).
11. Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224 n.5); see also Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 
554 F.3d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that no substantial similarity existed because no reasonable, 
properly instructed jury could find that the protectable expressions of the two house f loor-plans were 
substantially similar).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
13. Id.
14. See Shipley, supra note 7, at 3–7 (explaining the unique feature of architectural design in creating not 
only an artistic work, but also a functional building, and noting that society’s need for useful buildings 
cannot be impeded by trying to protect individual elements like doorways).
15. See Newsam, supra note 1, at 1101–04; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949.
16. Intervest, 554 F.3d at 919 (“Accordingly, any similarity comparison of the works at issue . . . must be 
accomplished at the level of protected expression—that is, the arrangement and coordination of those 
common elements.”).
17. See Shipley, supra note 7, at 7.
18. See id. 
19. See, e.g., Intervest, 554 F.3d at 921; Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2008); Bldg. Graphics, Inc. v. Lennar Corp., 866 F. Supp. 2d 530, 543–45 (W.D.N.C. 2011) 
(utilizing the typical ad hoc basis to distinguish an expression from an idea).
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 The issue in Sieger Suarez was whether a constructed condominium building was 
similar enough to the design in an architectural blueprint to constitute copyright 
infringement.20 The dispute involved a prominent South Florida architecture firm, 
the Sieger Suarez Architectural Partnership (“plaintiff ”), against another prominent 
architecture firm and two real estate developers, Arquitectonica International, 
Regalia Beach Developers, and Golden Beach Developers (collectively, the 
“defendants”).21 The plaintiff filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, alleging 
copyright infringement of its architectural design plans for a condominium building.22 
The court held that despite the comparable exterior shapes and conceptual 
similarities, the plaintiff ’s designs and the defendants’ condominium building were 
not substantially similar as a matter of law because the individual design elements of 
each expressed the buildings’ shapes in different ways.23
 This case comment contends, first, that the court erred in creating a new, stricter 
four-factor interpretation of the substantial similarity test instead of following the 
“average lay observer” interpretation articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Oravec v. 
Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C.24 Second, in applying its new four-factor test, the 
court erred by categorizing the design plan arrangements as unprotected “ideas” 
instead of protected “expressions.”25 Third, the practical reality of a higher standard 
of scrutiny with four specific factors forces judges to bear the burden of conducting 
detailed design analysis that is far removed from their typical realm of legal expertise. 
It would be preferable for a jury of laypeople, who view these architectural designs in 
everyday life, to determine substantial similarity by applying the Eleventh Circuit’s 
“average lay observer” test.26
 In August 2000, the plaintiff was hired by Mori Classics to design a building 
plan for a project eventually known as Regalia.27 By May 2006, defendant 
Arquitectonica had replaced the plaintiff as the architect, and the plaintiff had no 
further involvement in the project.28 In March 2011, defendants Regalia Beach 
Developers and Golden Beach Developers took over the project from Mori Classics.29 
The plaintiff later learned that construction had begun, allegedly using the plaintiff ’s 
20. Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343–45 
(S.D. Fla. 2014).
21. Id. at 1343–44.
22. Id. at 1343.
23. Id. at 1353–54.
24. Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224.
25. See, e.g., Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919–21 (11th Cir. 
2008) (explaining that the arrangement and coordination of common elements reaches the level of 
protected expression).
26. See, e.g., id. at 920; Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224; Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1250–51 (11th 
Cir. 2007).
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copyrighted architectural design plans.30 Thus, the plaintiff filed a complaint against 
the defendants on May 31, 2013 in the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, 
and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a viable cause of 
action, which the court granted.31
 The specific architectural elements in dispute were the exterior façade elements, 
or the “exterior face”32 of the buildings.33 The exterior façade of each building 
included an overall f lower shape and rounded curve designs that gave the building 
exterior an impression of movement or f luidity.34 The plaintiff argued that its 
building’s f lower shape and the rounded curve design of its exterior façade were 
protected under the copyright because they were “arrangements and combinations” 
that are recognized as protected expressions of architectural design.35 The plaintiff 
argued that the correct test for substantial similarity was whether “an average lay 
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the 
copyrighted work.”36 The defendants asserted that the building shape and exterior 
façade were merely architectural “ideas”—standard design features that are not 
protected by a copyright, regardless of any substantial similarity.37
 The court held that although the buildings’ outward appearances were comparable 
and inspired by the same f lower shape and rounded façade, each expressed its 
architectural “ideas” differently in achieving its end results.38 The court declared a 
new, four-factor test for finding substantial similarity which relies on expression found 
in: (1) the manner by which a design is achieved; (2) the use of structures and details; 
(3) the manner in which an individual interacts with the space; and (4) the location.39
30. Id. at 1345. The court held that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright for the Regalia Project based on 
Certificates of Registration issued by the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. at 1351.
31. Id. at 1343–45.
32. An exterior façade is a common architectural term used to refer to the outside features of a building. A 
façade is defined as “[a]n exterior face or elevation of a building.” City of Phx., Planning & Dev. 
Dep’t, General Design Guidelines for Historic Properties 3 (1996), https://www.phoenix.gov/
pddsite/Documents/pdd_hp_pdf_00035.pdf.
33. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1351–54.
34. Id. at 1352–53. The court also analyzed the interior f loor plans and the use of structure and detail, but 
it was not the main area of concern for protected expressions under the substantial similarity analysis. 
Id. at 1353–54.
35. Plaintiff, the Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc.’s, Response to Defendant, Arquitectonica Int’l 
Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss Counts the Complaint at 12, Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. 
Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, No. 13-cv-21928-JLK, 2013 WL 6498635 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2013).
36. Id. at 14.
37. Defendant Arquitectonica International Corp.’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 6, Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l 
Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, No. 13-cv-21928-King/McAliley, 2013 WL 9662081 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 
2013).
38. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1352–54.
39. Id. at 1348–49.
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 The court reasoned that the buildings’ exterior façade elements achieved their 
designs in different manners and characterized the façades as “strikingly different” in 
outward appearance.40 One distinction the court noted was between the defendants’ 
wrap-around, irregularly shaped balconies and the plaintiff ’s rounded corner 
balconies.41 The court also reasoned that a clear difference existed in the outward 
appearances and visual impressions of the buildings because the defendants’ “oscillating 
wave” effect was different from the plaintiff ’s “smooth, static wave” design.42 Similarly, 
the court called the expression of the flower shape “vastly different” in each building.43
 However, the court noted in its analysis that the two designs were similar in the 
“striking aspect” of each work’s f lower shape and the distinctive visual impression of 
a horizontally rippling wave created by each building’s exterior.44 Although the court 
determined that the number of condominium units per f loor, the height of the 
building, and the height of the ceilings were not protectable evidence of copyright 
infringement, it also acknowledged that the defendants may have used the plaintiff ’s 
work to bypass the need to create their own independent work.45 Regardless, in 
evaluating the relevant design aspects under the new four-factor test for substantial 
similarity, the court found an intellectual relationship between the concepts and 
ideas of the plaintiff ’s work and those of the defendants’ work, but not between the 
expression and overall execution of the two works.46 Interestingly, the court only 
analyzed two of its newly articulated four factors in finding that no substantial 
similarity existed: (1) the manner by which a design is achieved and (2) the use of 
structures and details.47
 This case comment contends that the Sieger Suarez court erred in applying a new, 
four-factor approach that creates a higher standard for interpreting the substantial 
similarity test instead of the “average lay observer” interpretation articulated by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Oravec.48 Furthermore, the court failed to identify the Sieger 
Suarez building’s shape and exterior façade design as protected expressions under the 
“compilation” or “arrangement” standard set by the Eleventh Circuit in Intervest 
Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc.49 Moreover, the practical impact of 
the Sieger Suarez court’s higher standard of scrutiny, with specific factors, results in 
judges bearing the burden of conducting detailed design analysis in place of a jury—
40. Id. at 1352.
41. Id. at 1352–54.
42. Id. at 1352–53.
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1352.
45. Id. at 1351.
46. Id. (describing the similarities as “intellectual” and identifying the similar elements as unprotected 
standard features and not expressions or compilations deserving copyright protection).
47. Id. at 1351–54.
48. 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008). 
49. 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008).
559
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
comprised of the actual viewing audience—determining substantial similarity under 
the more appropriate “average lay observer” test.
 First, the Sieger Suarez court failed to apply the Oravec “average lay observer” test 
for substantial similarity.50 In Oravec, the Eleventh Circuit held that a substantial 
similarity exists “where an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as 
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”51 Architect Paul Oravec filed 
copyright infringement claims against numerous individuals and entities associated 
with the Trump Palace Buildings in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, after seeing pictures 
of two Trump condominium buildings that he believed to be nearly identical to his 
copyrighted architectural designs.52 The Oravec court focused its substantial 
similarity analysis on whether a reasonable person would view the buildings and 
plans as similar.53 The court held that there was not a substantial similarity because 
the building in Oravec’s plans had five alternating concave segments running the 
entire length of its exterior on both sides, whereas each Trump building had only 
three segments appearing at the top half of its exterior on one side.54 Additionally, 
the Oravec court noted that Oravec’s plans contained exposed elevator shafts which 
were obstructed on alternating f loors by the alternating concave segments, whereas a 
viewer could clearly see exposed elevator shafts for the entire length of each Trump 
building.55 Accordingly, the Oravec court found that “no reasonable jury, properly 
instructed, could find the competing works substantially similar . . . .”56
 The average lay observer test for substantial similarity in Oravec takes a more 
general, “viewer focused” approach than the technical, four-factor test in Sieger 
Suarez.57 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy 
Loft, Inc. also applied the average lay observer test to a copyright infringement 
claim.58 The Original Appalachian court held that two toy doll designs were 
substantially similar because an ordinary observer would be inclined to overlook any 
50. Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224.
51. Id. (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 
1982)); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215–16 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
motion for summary judgment was inappropriate for a copyright infringement claim involving two 
photographs because a jury could reasonably find substantial similarity under the “average lay observer 
test” in expressive elements such as the photographic angle, hanging Spanish moss in the background, 
and location and lighting that draws the viewers’ attention to a girl).
52. Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1221–22. 




57. Compare id. at 1224, with Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. 
Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“Rather than simply continue down the oft-misleading road of ad 
hoc analysis, the Court will consider certain telling factors of substantial similarity . . . for determining 
the level of similarity between architectural works.”).
58. 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982).
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minor differences, such as the dolls’ facial expressions and nose and finger shapes, 
and find that the dolls had the same “aesthetic appeal,” or general feeling and overall 
impression.59 Thus, the court upheld a valid copyright infringement claim.60
 In Oravec, the exterior segments and exposed elevator shafts with different 
numbers and segment lengths were clear and obvious differences. An average lay 
observer, however, would not be able to differentiate between the two buildings in 
Sieger Suarez.61 The Sieger Suarez court’s reasoning that the exterior façade of the 
defendants’ building achieved its design in a different manner goes to great lengths 
of artistic analysis beyond those of an average lay observer.62 The court even 
characterized the outward appearances of the buildings as “strikingly different” 
because the defendants’ building had wrap-around, irregularly shaped balconies 
while the plaintiff ’s design had rounded corner balconies.63 Under the Original 
Appalachian court’s reasoning, an ordinary observer would have the impression that 
both buildings were substantially similar because both façades created the same 
horizontally rippling wave effect.64 The minor differences in details are less 
significant, and an average lay observer would likely be inclined to overlook such 
minute differences as balcony shapes and find that the overall works have the same 
“aesthetic appeal,” much like the dolls in Original Appalachian.65
 In addition, the Sieger Suarez court contradicted its own point that a “striking” 
difference existed by admitting that the building designs are similar in the “striking 
aspect” of each work’s f lower shape exterior design and the same distinctive wave 
impression created by each exterior façade.66 The Sieger Suarez court erred in calling the 
design methods “vastly different” under its new test and distinguishing between works 
that the court even admitted had the same flower shape impression upon a viewer.67
 The very nature of experiencing an artistic work is subjective and varies by the 
individual; thus, a comparative analysis for artistic works fits more appropriately 
within the looser ad hoc standard of how the average observer views a structure and 
not within specific factors.68 Therefore, unlike the buildings in Oravec, the buildings 
59. Id.
60. Id. at 830.
61. See Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 (describing the usual analysis for substantial similarity as too 
vague and misleading under the “average observer” test found in Eleventh Circuit precedent). 
62. See id. at 1347, 1352.
63. Id. at 1352.
64. Id. 
65. See Original Appalachian, 684 F.2d at 829 (“[T]he copier . . . will not avoid liability for infringement if 
‘the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, 
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.’” (quoting Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 
401, 402 (2nd Cir. 1971))).
66. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
67. Id. 
68. See Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000) (describing the difficulty in 
evaluating qualities such as mood).
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in Sieger Suarez would likely pass the average lay observer test considering the 
similarities the Sieger Suarez court noted.
 Instead of following the Oravec average lay observer test, the Sieger Suarez court 
created a new four-factor test for substantial similarity that raises the standard of 
scrutiny.69 In applying this test, the Sieger Suarez court did not even address the third 
and fourth factors that it created to determine substantial similarity—the manner in 
which an individual relates to a space and the location of the structure.70 Therefore, in 
enacting its own test, the Sieger Suarez court established an extremely high standard 
of evaluation under which dissimilarity between only two of the four factors can be 
dispositive, thus preventing copyright protection except in limited circumstances.
 Second, the Sieger Suarez court failed to identify the building shapes and exterior 
façade designs as protected expressions in analyzing substantial similarity, contrary 
to the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of protected expressions in Intervest.71 In 
Intervest, the Eleventh Circuit applied the substantial similarity test to a limited 
category of protectable design elements.72 As the Intervest court noted, the legislative 
history of the Copyright Act illustrates that “individual standard features” such as 
“common windows, doors, and other staple building components,” were not intended 
as protectable design elements.73
 However, the phrase “the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements 
in the design” indicates that Congress viewed architectural creativity as frequently 
taking “the form of a selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotectable 
elements into an original, protectable whole.”74 The individual features alone may not 
be subject to protection as mere ideas, but together the individual features create a 
combination or compilation arrangement of expression that meets the level protected 
by a copyright.75 Thus, the distinction is not easily defined and creates difficulty in 
distinguishing between what is protected at an expression level and what is not 
protected at an individual standard feature level.76
69. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1347–49.
70. Id. at 1351–54 (omitting any reference whatsoever to the third and fourth factors in reaching a holding 
of no substantial similarity).
71. See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008).
72. Id. at 919, 921.
73. Id. at 919 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-735 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 919–21; see also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
no substantial similarity existed between a painting and an actual theme park development because only 
similar individual standard features were present and such design elements are mere ideas that are not 
protected by copyright, although the arrangement of such ideas to create a unique combination may be 
protectable). 
76. Intervest, 554 F.3d at 920; see also Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2008) (“This distinction—known as the idea/expression dichotomy—can be difficult to 
apply, as there is no bright line separating the ideas conveyed by a work from the specific expression of 
those ideas.”).
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 In Intervest, the Eleventh Circuit held that no copyright infringement occurred 
because the only similar elements between two floor plans for personal family homes 
were standard individual features, not protectable architectural design aspects.77 In 
particular, the Intervest court focused on the nature of the buildings as single-family 
homes and standard individual design features such as common kitchen fixtures, a 
two-car garage, and typical living room and dining room units.78
 In contrast, the Sieger Suarez court erred in conducting a more in-depth analysis 
of the compilation expressions created by the wave effect and the overall f lower shape 
of the buildings’ structural designs.79 The court went especially far in trying to 
establish a clear difference in the outward appearance and visual impression of the 
buildings by contrasting the defendants’ “oscillating wave” effect with the plaintiff ’s 
“smooth, static wave.”80 Unlike the unprotected individual elements, such as kitchen 
fixtures, discussed in Intervest, the elements in question in Sieger Suarez were the 
overall f lower shape and rounded curve design of the entire building exterior, which 
more closely fit the compilation or arrangement definition of a protectable expression.
 The Sieger Suarez court found that design details such as the number of 
condominium units per f loor, the height of the building, and the height of the 
ceilings were not protectable expressions.81 While these elements are likely individual 
standard features, the arrangement of the exterior façade design and overall building 
shape should have been considered protectable expressions because they are unique 
compilations of individual design features—such as balcony units and windows—
that together create the wave and flower impression for a viewer.82 Thus, the façade 
and building shape are at a higher level of compilation expression and are not mere 
individual standard features like the dimensions of a two-car garage or dining room 
in Intervest.83 The Sieger Suarez court even acknowledged that the defendants may 
have used the plaintiff ’s work to bypass the need to create their own totally 
independent work.84 Therefore, the Sieger Suarez court erred in finding no substantial 
similarity between designs that actually shared protected expressions of overall 
design compilation rather than unprotected common idea elements unrecognized by 
copyright law.
 The decision in Sieger Suarez raises an already high standard of review by 
introducing a four-factor test. The Eleventh Circuit, in Oravec and Intervest, had 
already raised the standard of scrutiny for architectural copyright protection by 
77. Intervest, 554 F.3d at 921.
78. Id. at 916–21.
79. Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351–54 
(S.D. Fla. 2014).
80. See id. at 1352–53.
81. Id. at 1351.
82. See id. at 1352.
83. See Intervest, 554 F.3d at 918–21.
84. Sieger Suarez, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 1351–52.
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emphasizing that such cases are appropriate for a judge to decide on a motion for 
summary judgment rather than allowing a jury to evaluate substantial similarity at 
trial.85 The Sieger Suarez court’s four-factor test and its high standard for determining 
what constitutes a protected expression goes too far and may act as a disincentive for 
architects to create original designs.86
 The Sieger Suarez court’s technical analysis for substantial similarity, articulated 
for the first time in the newly created four-factor test, creates an unfairly high standard 
for finding copyright infringement that is inconsistent with Eleventh Circuit 
precedent.87 In Oravec, the court emphasized that the substantial similarity test is 
applied at the level of an average lay observer.88 The Sieger Suarez court’s specific 
factors require a more nuanced level of analysis and create additional work for trial 
judges who are already overburdened with increasingly high caseloads.89 Judges are 
legal professionals and are not trained to perform this level of detailed design analysis. 
The decision in Sieger Suarez will lead to arbitrary decisionmaking and potential error, 
as well as the further clogging of already overburdened judicial dockets.
 Moreover, a continued theme throughout Eleventh Circuit precedent is that the 
distinction between an idea and an expression is extremely difficult to identify and 
quantify. There is no clear, bright line separating the ideas that compose a work from 
the overall expression that is conveyed by those ideas.90 A higher standard for 
substantial similarity, with specific factors, will result in judges conducting in-depth 
design analysis like that in Sieger Suarez.91 The judiciary should uphold valid 
copyrights and protect unique expressions of architectural design when the average 
layperson, who is the actual audience viewing and judging such a design in the real 
world, can articulate a substantial similarity between two architectural works.92 
Therefore, in addition to its legal errors, the holding in Sieger Suarez places an 
inappropriate burden on the judiciary to conduct an in-depth design analysis when 
determining copyright infringement of an architectural work.
85. See Stephen Milbrath, The 11th Circuit’s New Copyright Standard for Architectural Works, Fla. B.J., Nov. 
2009, at 49, 50–51. 
86. See generally Shipley, supra note 7, at 7 (describing the effect of the 1990 Copyright Act’s inclusion of 
architectural works as unclear).
87. See Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(applying the average lay observer test for substantial similarity to restaurant f loor plans); Intervest 
Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008); Oravec v. Sunny Isles 
Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008).
88. Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224.
89. See Keith Matheny, Court, Jail Overload is Putting True Justice in Doubt, USA Today (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-03-courtcuts03_ST_N.htm.
90. See Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224; Intervest, 554 F.3d at 920; Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 
1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
91. See Sieger Suarez Architectural P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351–
54 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
92. See Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1224.
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 The Sieger Suarez court erred by applying a stricter, four-factor test to determine 
that substantial similarity did not exist between the plaintiff ’s designs and the 
defendants’ condominium building. The two buildings meet the Oravec “average lay 
observer” substantial similarity test, and the unique f lower shape of the structures 
and the rippling wave exterior façades constitute protectable compilation expressions 
under Intervest. The result of Sieger Suarez’s new test and its narrow interpretation of 
expression is an impossibly high burden for sustaining a valid copyright infringement 
claim that fails to uphold the Copyright Act’s expansive definition of architectural 
works intended to receive protection.93
93. See Shipley, supra note 7, at 7.
